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From the Chair EUSA Review Forum
Liesbet Hooghe
EUSA AT TWENTY: CONFERENCE AT 
MARINA DEL REY
the executive committee had its annual meeting in April. 
This newsletter contains important information on a 
slew of decisions, to which we ask you to respond: 
a call for conference proposals, a call for election 
nominations to the EUSA executive committee, Prize 
committees, membership renewal, and your input 
on new online initiatives. Forms are available online 
as well as in this Review. Let me take these in turn. 
Conference. The upcoming conference in Marina 
del Rey, near LA, on April 23-25, 2009, will introduce 
several innovations. First, EUSA is moving to a de-
centralized program committee. The program, under 
the stewardship of program chair Frank Schimmelfen-
nig, is divided into six thematic streams: integration 
theory, institutions, economics and political economy, 
political sociology, law and public policy, and exter-
nal relations. Each stream will be handled by a per-
son appointed by the excom; names are listed on the 
online call for proposals. You will be asked to select 
a stream. There is no pre-set number of panels by 
stream, so your choice merely helps in channeling 
proposals to particular committee members and in or-
ganizing the program. If your proposal is not selected 
by 'your' stream representative, it goes into a common 
pool available for selection until the program is final-
ized. The program committee welcomes the broadest 
possible range of proposals engaging Europe or the 
European Union—alone or in a comparative frame. 
Second, EUSA is introducing workshops as an at-
tractive substitute for poster sessions. In two central 
time slots (Friday morning and Saturday morning) pa-
pers will be grouped in thematic workshops. Present-
ers will give very brief statements (not full presenta-
tions) and then move straight to discussion facilitated 
by the chair. Multiple workshops will run concurrently 
in a large room, so that visitors can move around. Our 
hope is that this format will promote more substantive 
interaction than standard panels. It is also an excel-
(continued on p. 23)
Revisiting Landmark Contributions to EU Studies
many aspects of the eu as we know it today, and major 
lines of EU scholarship as well, date from the early 
1990s. A decade earlier, the view had been wide-
spread that the European Economic Community was 
moribund. It wasn’t going away, but it wasn’t likely to 
develop major new powers. By the mid-1990s, the en-
tity that now went by “EU” had recaptured the aura of 
inevitable progress that had surrounded its origins. The 
rapid succession of the “relaunch” around the Single 
Market 1992 project and the monetary union plan in 
the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, together with the long-
delayed Iberian enlargement and (after 1989) the pros-
pect of many more accessions, gave the impression of 
a Europe moving toward a union that was both “ever 
closer” and ever wider. In academia, interest in the EU 
exploded. Andrew Moravcsik reformulated broader 
international relations theories into an account of the 
1980s relaunch, and then of EU history overall, to por-
tray the EU as an example of normal international co-
operation (albeit the most well-developed one). A vari-
ety of other scholars defended views more in line with 
the early pioneering work of Ernst Haas, arguing that 
institutional processes at work in Europe were carry-
ing it far beyond intergovernmental interaction. In one 
widely-cited piece, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks 
helped create the “multi-level governance” school, 
which later largely evolved into today’s burgeoning 
“Europeanization” literature, with their arguments that 
the EU was developing into a genuine polity. In an-
other, Walter Mattli and Anne-Marie Slaughter trans-
lated an emerging literature on EU legal integration 
into a powerful renewal of Haas’s neofunctionalism.
This issue’s Forum brings you commentaries on 
these three landmark articles by the authors. They 
address how they think their arguments have stood 
the test of time. Besides the intellectual interest in 
considering how these authors perceive their contri-
butions in light of subsequent developments, I hope 
that these essays will be of use for both graduate and 
undergraduate teaching. The commentaries discuss 
some of the choices these scholars made along the 
way (and a few of their regrets), and will help stu-
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Good-bye to “Federalist” Theory
Andrew Moravcsik
serendipity often drives scholarship. I was fortunate to 
arrive early in a scholarly generation destined to ap-
ply general political science theories to the European 
Union. Political scientists had previously approached 
Europe with unique concepts, such as federalism, 
neo-functionalism, spillover, spillback, and suprana-
tionalism—teleological ideal-types rather than theoret-
ical concepts able to explain variation in behavior. By 
the early 1970s, Stanley Hoffmann (one of my thesis 
advisors) and Ernst Haas (a source of much informal 
and uncommonly honest advice, despite our disagree-
ments) already conceded in print that EU studies was 
in a cul-de-sac (Hoffmann 1966; Haas 1975). Inspired 
in part by their criticism, students of theirs such as 
Robert Keohane (another of my advisors) and Joseph 
Nye (a mentor) sought to generate more general the-
ories—thereby founding the new field of international 
political economy (IPE) and developing new theoreti-
cal tools, such as endogenous policy theory, relational 
concepts of power, and regime theory. Yet no one had 
gone back to apply the insights of modern internation-
al political economy to the EU. This was the research 
program that underlay “Negotiating the Single Act” 
(Moravcsik 1991), and much of my subsequent work.
In this early article, my basic point was that intra-
EU bargaining resembles interstate bargaining else-
where in world politics: Governments pursue national 
interests, then pursue them exercising influence as a 
function of patterns of asymmetrical interdependence. 
I opposed view this to work by Haas, Wayne Sand-
holtz and John Zysman, who had stressed unintended 
consequences and political entrepreneurship by third 
parties, such as idealistic Brussels officials and trans-
national business groups (Haas 1958; Sandholz and 
Zysman 1989). The course of the SEA negotiations 
appeared, I thought, to support my view. Governments 
advanced their own proposals, and the ultimate out-
comes reflected the overlapping set of national inter-
ests, not the dreams of figures like Jacques Delors.
The article’s weaknesses are too obvious to re-
quire much discussion. It was the work of a graduate 
student, narrow and un-nuanced in many places—
very much the beginning, not the end, of a scholarly 
dents to contextualize these major articles not just 
as forbiddingly brilliant contributions but as the work 
of real human beings. They should also greatly fa-
cilitate comprehension and discussion of these three 
pieces that are on almost every EU-seminar syllabus.
-Craig Parsons, EUSA  Review Editor
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debate. It is, most obviously, narrow, lacking essential 
theories of preferences and institutionalization. The 
bargaining theory and agenda-setting is simplistic. 
(The latter would not be provided until nearly a de-
cade later, when I published a theory of informal inter-
national political entrepreneurship, thereby—ironical-
ly—forging a critical missing link in neo-functionalist 
thought). (Moravcsik 1999) Perhaps most importantly, 
it is empirically thin. In the 1999 article, based on supe-
rior theory and a comparison of five cases, it emerged 
that third-party entrepreneurship has generally been 
insignificant in EU history, but in one case third parties 
were relatively somewhat more important: the SEA! 
This is because the major comparative advantage 
of third parties vis-à-vis states, it turned out, was not 
greater information, expertise, legitimacy, or status as 
an impartial mediator, but superior ability to coordinate 
package deals across disparate domestic bureaucra-
cies. In the end, Sandholtz and Zysman were more 
correct than I conceded in 1991, though for reasons 
neither I nor they fathomed at the time. Yet the case we 
argued about was atypical. Social science progress-
es over time: Only in light of better theory and data 
could one formulate this more nuanced conclusion.
These details matter little. In retrospect, the arti-
cle’s real significance is that it marked the first step 
toward the formulation of what is still referred to to-
day as a “liberal intergovernmentalist” (LI) framework. 
The LI framework explains major EU decisions in 
three stages. Any student of IPE would immediately 
recognize these theoretical components as basic to 
modern theories of international cooperation: Na-
tional preferences are explained with endogenous 
policy theory. Substantive outcomes of interstate 
bargaining (on the basis of the preferences) are ex-
plained with Nash bargaining theory, operationalized 
using asymmetrical interdependence. And institu-
tional pooling and delegation (to implement substan-
tive outcomes) are explained using regime theory. 
At the time, ”Negotiating the Single Act” was uni-
versally rejected. Continental Europeans found its ar-
gument suspiciously “Anglo-Saxon”, neo-functionalists 
found it too realist, policy analysts and students of com-
parative politics found it simplistic, practitioners (and 
admirers of Delors) found it insufficiently deferential to 
great men, lawyers found it overly political, historians 
found it drily theoretical and, above all else, federal-
ists found it insufficiently deferential to European ide-
als. It was cited almost exclusively in a critical mode.
Fast forward 15 years and much has changed. To 
see this one need look no further than the current state 
of the EU. LI predicts that without a functional “grand 
projet”, we will not see major forward movement toward 
institutional reform in the EU—and this is precisely 
what we observe. The most striking aspect of Euro-
pean integration since 1992 is its stability. Despite the 
constitutional debacle of recent years, we observe a 
“European constitutional settlement” in place: a stable 
substantive, institutional, and normative balance within 
which incremental EU policy-making occurs. Amster-
dam, Nice and Lisbon mark only incremental movement 
along slow trends strengthening the Council and Parlia-
ment and expanding intergovernmental functions out-
side the “first pillar.” After a disastrous decade of dem-
ocratic constitutional experimentalism, governments 
have gone back to classic intergovernmental politics.
Why? Most fundamentally because there is no 
functional justification for major change. Participants 
in the EU’s recent constitutional convention spent al-
most no time on proposals for substantive reform, be-
cause there was no point: today no proposal akin to 
the single market or currency enjoys enough support 
to be taken seriously. Social policy, centralized neo-
liberal reform, and immigration, attractive though they 
may be to philosophers, lack either political consen-
sus or functional justification. The status quo is un-
likely to be upset, except by a major exogenous shock 
we cannot yet foresee, or by incremental change.
Enlargement is the proverbial “exception that 
proves the rule.” The only unforeseen exogenous 
shock since the late 1980s was the end of the Cold 
War. Socio-economic and political stabilization of 
Europe’s immediate periphery became a concern, 
generating the only major EU policy shift since 
Maastricht. Enlargement to the south and east was 
possible, however, simply by extending current in-
stitutions and policies, backed by a modest expan-
sion in intergovernmental capacity for foreign poli-
cy and defense cooperation—and so it was done. 
Some historical institutionalists maintain that en-
largement was unintended and unwanted, rather than 
an instrumental response to functional pressure. While 
such theories enjoyed some success in explaining su-
premacy of European law—though even there it has 
limits—there have been few empirically compelling ef-
forts to extend it to other areas of EU policy-making. 
As a general explanation for enlargement, it remains 
strikingly implausible. Consider, for example, Frank 
Schimmelfennig’s widely discussed claim—to simplify 
a subtle argument—that EU member states rashly 
promised to let in new members, and Commission ac-
tivism plus their own guilty consciences held them to 
that promise (Schimmelfennig 2003a). Due to “rhetori-
cal entrapment,” he claims, 15 members became 27.
This most obvious weakness in this argument, 
we can see now, is that EU governments have unani-
mously renewed the promise and the policy over 
the past two decades: choosing a “big bang” rather 
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than a mini-enlargement, offering membership to Ro-
mania and Bulgaria, extending the policy down the 
Western Balkans, systematically removing obstacles 
(French constitutional barriers, the recognition of Ko-
sovo, technical inhibitions), and today even maintain-
ing deliberate ambiguity about the future of Turkey, 
despite hostile public opinion. Leaders consistently 
support the policy not because they are idealists, or 
trapped, but because it serves their perceived nation-
al interest. They have used promises and delegation 
as a means to “lock-in” policy against domestic op-
ponents, again just as LI theory predicts. The current 
state of the EU makes little sense from any perspec-
tive other than one that stresses national interests, 
interstate bargaining, and institutional commitment.
In scholarly terms, LI theory has also emerged 
over the past 15 years as the foundation of what one 
leading scholar terms the “dominant” theory of integra-
tion (Pollack 2000). Another speaks of “the centrality 
of Ll to theory and explanation of European integra-
tion…and its status as a baseline theory.” (Schimmelf-
ennig 2003:93). Studies of the most consequential 
EU policies—CAP reform, external trade policy, free 
movement of people, services deregulation, budget-
ary affairs, to name a few—uniformly confirm it. Entire 
research programs (and not just the historical institu-
tionalist arguments above), originally seen as viable 
alternatives, have floundered. After over a decade of 
formally modeling the institutional details of the EU 
legislative process, empirical data suggests that pref-
erences and veto positions, not institutional details, ex-
plain outcomes—just as LI theory predicts. (This result 
holds for constitutional decisions as well as everyday 
ones.) (Thompson et al 2006). At the opposite theoret-
ical extreme, sustained efforts to show that “socializa-
tion” of national and supranational officials in the EU’s 
Council and Commission structures explain interstate 
bargaining outcomes have been shown to lack empiri-
cal support, as against regime-theoretical alternatives.
The full breadth of the underlying empirical con-
sensus in favor of LI theory is obscured by two odd 
characteristics of the scholarly literature. One is a 
selection bias in research topics away from substan-
tively important issues (like agriculture and trade) and 
toward insignificant, exceptional or emerging issues, 
and secondary institutions. An example is the enor-
mous interdisciplinary literature on the Open Method 
of Coordination, notably in social policy. This is in-
telligent and insightful work, but even its staunchest 
defenders concede that neither OMC nor EU social 
policy has yet to generate any major policy achieve-
ment equal to those listed above. Or consider the 
enormous attention given to relatively few cases of 
successful Commission activism (e.g. Article 90 in 
telecommunications), compared to general disinter-
est in the far more important two-decade decline in 
the Commission’s power. Another example is the de-
tailed analyses lavished on voting within the relatively 
weak Parliament, for which we have splendid method-
ological tools, as compared to the far more powerful 
Council. It is time to reweight literature reviews, text-
books, and special issues of journals so as to better 
reflect the importance of what the EU actually does. 
A second reason why one does not always perceive 
LI’s strength in the literature is that many articles focus 
on novel theories, while using LI as a baseline, con-
trol or background. Read the empirical data, however, 
and one finds that—unlike many such baselines in po-
litical science—national preferences, veto power and 
transaction costs remain the most powerful explana-
tory variables, with the other factors explaining residu-
als. One example is Kathleen McNamara’s admirable 
book-length analysis of EU monetary integration (Mc-
Namara 1998). McNamara characterizes her work as 
constructivist, but in fact much of it quietly works within 
an broader LI paradigm. She views states as instru-
mental international actors with exogenous preferenc-
es. They bargain among themselves and institutional-
ize the results. She concedes that economic interests 
as important in their calculations. Her challenge to or-
thodox IPE is limited to the very plausible claim that 
monetary preferences cannot be derived solely from 
patterns of interdependence but also reflect socially 
constructed ideas about monetary policy. The notion 
that monetary policy, an issue-area where material 
consequences are more uncertain than trade policy, 
requires a more complex preference function has long 
been accepted in IPE. Thus McNamara’s results are 
not only quite consistent with the LI model, but actually 
depart from it in only one particular—albeit an important 
one. Much contemporary EU scholarship does like-
wise, departing from the orthodoxy in only one respect.
This conclusion is not meant to be triumphalist. It 
is meant to be ecumenical. If the analysis above is cor-
rect, scholarship in EU studies is converging toward 
a common framework—in fact if not in name. Ninety 
percent of the work in EU studies today, at least that 
having to do with constitutional change and legislative 
decision-making, views states as the critical actors with 
distinct preferences, strategic priorities, and institution-
al strategies. Increasingly the real debate focuses on 
the nature of the components: the precise specification 
of state preferences, interstate bargaining, and institu-
tionalization. (Not all theories fit the mold, but most 
do.) If we focus our efforts on investigating these de-
tailed empirical puzzles, we will transcend what is per-
haps the final vestige of the old style of EU theorizing 
that dominated the field in 1991: the tendency to frame 
debates in terms of disagreements among “grand” 
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theories. The purpose of social science theory, after 
all, is to transform philosophical debates into empirical 
ones. This was always the deeper aim of “Negotiat-
ing the Single Act.” Today it is finally within our grasp.
Andrew Moravcsik is Professor of Politics and Direc-
tor, European Union Program, Princeton University
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Postscript to the "The Making of a Polity"
Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks
the "making of a polity" (1999) diagnoses the coali-
tions and conflicts that would arise if the European 
Union were transformed into a polity responsible for 
fundamental decisions binding on individuals living in 
its member states. 1 What if the European Union was 
such a polity in the making, not merely a means for 
internalizing policy externalities or regulating trade? 
What if the choices that confronted Europeans were 
larger, far larger, than determining the prices of agri-
cultural products or setting external tariffs? What would 
happen if those who led national political parties, inter-
est groups, and social movements came to realize that 
national states were being melded into a new institu-
tional set-up, a system of multilevel governance? What 
would be the contending visions? What fundamental 
conflicts would arise? Who would be on which side?
We tried to shed light on these questions by de-
scribing the genesis of the polity that was emerging 
after the Single European Act (1986). We strove to 
stay close to the ground, sketching developments in 
a straightforward way, yet our purpose was to argue 
that European integration would be determined not 
by industrialists, bureaucrats, or diplomats, but by 
leaders of broad political organizations—political par-
ties, social movements, interest groups—who had 
contending ideas about basic political institutions. 
We were writing for an audience which, at the time, 
did not believe that European integration amount-
ed to much. Comparative political economists con-
ceived European integration as a side-show which 
had little effect on national public policy and which 
had the awkward methodological effect of reducing 
the independence of the cases available for analysis. 
Building on the work of political economists, we ar-
gued that the impetus for the making of a European 
polity was the perceived failure of national Keynes-
ian policy. One response was to shift decision mak-
ing to private actors; another, complementary, shift 
was to Europe. This was the point of departure for 
European integration, “but not the destination,” for 
how was a European market to be governed? How 
much authority would be vested in European institu-
tions? What would be their policy responsibilities? 
Just as the creation of national policies over the 
past century had been framed in distributional, usu-
ally, class conflict, so we anticipated that distribu-
tional coalitions would contest European policies. 
Not that we expected a replay of state building. 
Left/right conflict over European issues could not 
follow the path of left/right conflict over national poli-
cies. The institutional barriers to market regulation 
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were quite high and the coalition that could propel 
Europe over them was weaker than in most mem-
ber states. There was no coherent European trade 
union movement, no working class, and little over-
arching cultural solidarity. In short, the conditions for 
a European welfare state or neocorporatism at the 
European level were absent (Streeck and Schmitter 
1991). The debate would be about how to regulate 
markets, not whether markets should be replaced. 
We described two overarching political designs or 
projects around which broad coalitions of political ac-
tors would form. A neoliberal project seeks to insulate 
markets from political interference by combining Euro-
pean-wide market integration with minimal European 
regulation. Neoliberals and their allies on the economic 
right want a single market within which national states 
compete for mobile factors by providing attractive reg-
ulatory regimes. They oppose the creation of authorita-
tive European institutions beyond those necessary to 
sustain market competition. On the other side, a proj-
ect for regulated capitalism brings together a disparate 
set of mainstream social democratic and centrist politi-
cal parties, social movements, and trade unions. They 
wish to build authority at the European level—which 
means empowering the European parliament and 
limiting the veto power of individual governments—to 
create what Jacques Delors described as an espace 
organisé, a peoples' Europe based on social reform 
and partnership among public and private actors.2
Fifteen years later, European integration has be-
come more participatory, and is more politicized, than 
we could have guessed. We claimed that European 
integration would “become a matter of the widest 
public discourse," but we had no notion of how wide 
and how public that contest would become—in 27 
(27!) referendums on Europe that have taken place 
since the 1992 referendum in France. We recognized 
that European integration was a high-profile issue 
which escaped the control of government leaders, 
but we did not dare to predict how frequently gov-
ernments might have to accept humiliating defeat 
on European issues at the hands of their citizens. 3 
What seemed extraordinary at the time—politiciza-
tion, mass participation, and elite vulnerability—has 
become almost ordinary with the passage of time. 4 
But we misunderstood or simply missed some im-
portant developments. First, we overestimated the ex-
tent to which social democrats would be willing and able 
to mobilize for supranationalism. We were aware that 
the center-left coalition for regulated capitalism was 
"weaker than the sum of its parts because it is extraor-
dinarily heterogeneous (91)," but we believed that there 
would be common ground among social democratic 
parties. The 1999 Amsterdam Treaty revealed that this 
did not extend to constitutional issues. Social demo-
cratic parties, governing in thirteen of fifteen member 
states, broadened EU competences to employment, 
social regulation, women’s rights, human rights, and 
the environment—but they did not deepen, at least not 
commensurately, the authority of the European Union. 
One reason for this is that social democrats were deep-
ly divided. A coalition for regulated capitalism would 
have had to encompass Jospin's socialism alongside 
Tony Blair's Third Way (Pollack 2000). Another rea-
son is that support for redistribution relies on a shared 
sense of community more than we imagined, and com-
munity is relatively weak in today’s European Union.
Second, we underestimated the extent to which 
European integration has intensified, as well as 
tamed, territorial politics. In “The Making of a Pol-
ity” we emphasized that European integration trans-
forms diplomacy into law making, implementation, 
and adjudication. We were probably right to hypoth-
esize that domestic groups of similar ideological 
stripes would form transnational coalitions. But we 
were wrong to believe that ideological conflict would 
cross-cut and thereby diminish territorial conflict. Eu-
ropean integration has actually exacerbated territorial 
politics because it encompasses diverse countries 
in a single polity (Hooghe and Marks forthcoming). 5
Were we to rewrite the paper today, we would surely 
pay more attention to judicial politics. The courts have 
been the bane and the boon of regulated capitalism. 
The bane in that the penchant of the European Court of 
Justice for knocking down economic barriers threatens 
social democratic achievements at the national level; 
the boon in that the Court has created extensive case 
law on gender equality, regional equality, the family, 
and protection of the environment (Cichowski 2004; 
Caporaso and Tarrow 2007). James Caporaso and Sid-
ney Tarrow observe that "social policy is already 'here' 
in the EU, in that market and social policy are increas-
ingly meshed with regulatory and redistributive poli-
tics. Karl Polanyi observed in the context of nineteenth 
century England that the logic of economic exchange 
is legally and politically embedded, and Caporaso and 
Tarrow extend this line of argument to the role of Euro-
pean Court of Justice in regulating the single market.
Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, we did 
not recognize the force of national identity in fomenting 
opposition to European integration. The contending vi-
sions that we described were political economic. Neo-
liberalism and regulated capitalism differ on the role 
of the state in the economy, on the distribution of eco-
nomic values, and on the relative virtues of economic 
freedom versus economic equality. They assume that 
the democratic class struggle takes place within given 
communities in given territories. They assume that con-
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flict is about who gets what (and how). Now we realize 
that the creation of a European polity engages more 
fundamental and more disruptive issues having to do 
with the boundaries of the political community, with the 
authenticity of national values and traditions, with po-
tentially combustible conceptions of "us” and “them.” 6
Liesbet Hooghe is Zachary Taylor Smith Professor 
of Political Science at the University of North Carolina 
in Chapel Hill and Chair in Multilevel Governance at 
the Free University Amsterdam.
Gary Marks is Burton Craige Professor of Political 
Science at the University of North Carolina in Chapel 
Hill and Chair in Multilevel Governance at the Free 
University Amsterdam.
Notes
1 “The Making of a Polity” was published in 1999 as 
part of a volume that examined the changing Euro-
pean political economy since the 1980s (Kitschelt, 
Lange, Marks, Stephens 1999). Our first effort to 
write a paper for the volume Continuity and Change 
in Contemporary Capitalism argued that the Europe-
an Community was being transformed into a system 
of multilevel governance which was eroding state 
sovereignty. This paper was published in the Journal 
of Common Market Studies in 1996 as "European 
Integration and the State: Multi-level vs. State-Centric 
Governance."
2 We wrote the first draft of “The Making of a Polity” 
for a conference held in Berlin in May 2005. As is 
often the case when the scientific community is grap-
pling with new facts, several people were thinking 
along similar lines. Our argument was consistent with 
the finding that social policy was being developed be-
yond the national state (Leibfried and Pierson 1995) 
and that European developments reflected a clash of 
capitalisms (Crouch and Streeck 1997; Rhodes and 
van Apeldoorn 1997).
3 Since 1992, governments have been defeated in 
referendums on six occasions. Just seven referen-
dums on Europe took place in the EU over the previ-
ous four decades—with no government defeats.
4 The search for an explanation of politicization has 
led us and others to examine political parties, social 
movements, and interest groups (see Hooghe and 
Marks forthcoming, for an overview).
5 In more recent work, we hypothesize that ideo-
logical coalitions form for policies that have similar 
distributional effects across countries and territorial 
coalitions form for policies that redistribute across 
countries (Marks 2004).  
6 In an early draft of “The Making of a Polity” we 
inserted a postscript entitled "Maastricht and the 
nationalist project" which discussed how national-
ism intensified politicization and diminished public 
support for the EU. We wrote that "Nationalism and 
anti-Europeanism go hand in hand. Radical streams 
within mainstream parties of the Right, including the 
British Conservative party and the French Gaullists, 
new and not so new extreme rightist parties in Den-
mark, Austria, Sweden, Italy, anti-Maastricht social 
movements in France and Spain—each of these 
privilege anti-Europeanism as a core feature of their 
programs." However, we cut the section because we 
were still thinking through the logic of national identity 
in relation to European integration and we believed 
that a third project would dilute the economic focus of 
the paper.
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From “Europe Before the Court” to 
the World Before Courts
Walter Mattli and Anne-Marie Slaughter
“europe before the court” developed a theory of how 
the most effective international tribunal in the world, 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ), succeeded in 
bringing about the legal integration of the European 
Community (Burley and Mattli 1993; Mattli and Slaugh-
ter 1995, 1998). Fifteen years after its publication, its 
central arguments hold up remarkably well. Equally 
important, they help to explain an increasingly large 
part of the international landscape, as the number of 
international and regional tribunals has exploded.1 
This increase has attracted the attention of a growing 
number of scholars, some of whom rehearse the same 
debates between intended consequences and unin-
tended consequences that we engaged with Geoffrey 
Garrett and others long ago. Overall, however, time 
has provided extensive evidence of the ways in which 
judges can act as autonomous actors with their own 
interests, as well as the ways in which those interests 
can mesh with the interests of domestic courts, lawyers, 
their clients, and even domestic regulatory agencies. 
What triggered legal integration in Europe? In the 
years following the signing of the Treaty of Rome, 
small concentrated groups opposed to integra-
tion successfully lobbied national governments for 
non-tariff barriers and other trade protectionist mea-
sures, thereby robbing European traders and con-
sumers of significant economic benefits promised in 
the Treaty. All governments were complicit in trade 
violations; thus none had an incentive to sue an-
other member-state government for fear of tit-for-tat 
retaliation. The ECJ judges seemingly could do little 
since only member states and the Commission had 
a right to bring cases to them, and very few cases 
were brought despite a growing number of violations. 
We argued that the unexpected actions taken by 
the ECJ to remedy this situation, and the far-reach-
ing consequences of these actions, corresponded 
better to Ernst Haas’s neofunctionalist account of 
how European integration was supposed to proceed 
than conventional theoretical accounts that assumed 
states got exactly what they bargained for. We iden-
tified the actors in this drama as a specialized com-
munity of judges, lawyers, legal scholars, and private 
actors with a vested interest in liberalized markets. 
Specifically, the ECJ judges promoted the prelimi-
nary rulings procedure which provided a framework 
for links between the Court and individual litigants, 
their lawyers, and lower national courts, enabling 
litigants to challenge national regulation incompat-
ible with the Treaty. Through this Court-built alliance, 
the judges successfully transferred a large portion of 
the business of interpreting and applying Community 
law from member-state governments inclined to fol-
low their immediate political interests to national and 
supranational institutions with a direct stake in hold-
ing those governments to their treaty obligations. 
The unfolding of legal integration, in our view, dis-
played all three features of Haas’s neo-functionalist 
model of integration: functional spill-over, political 
spill-over, and the upgrading of common interests. 
Functional spill-over came from the logic of law, the 
legal reasoning that led the ECJ to steadily expand its 
jurisdiction to related legal issues. Political spill-over 
occurred through what Court-watchers had already 
identified as “transnational incrementalism,” a process 
whereby the acceptance of ECJ doctrines by national 
courts in some countries led to pressures on courts in 
other countries to do the same, and through the overall 
legal process of shifting expectations based on the ac-
ceptance of legal decisions as establishing new base-
lines. The upgrading of common interests took place in 
the Court’s reasoning itself, which justified its interpre-
tation of the Treaty of Rome to further legal integration 
on the basis of the common interests of member states 
that led them to conclude the Treaty in the first place. 
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We identified the context in which these actors en-
gaged in this process as the apparent separation of 
law and politics. Law proved impervious to political in-
terference by the member-states, not only due to “the 
mask” of technical discourse, but also to “the shield” 
of domestic norms of rule of law and judicial indepen-
dence. However, we also argued that the ECJ could not 
outrun its constituency without losing its legitimacy, and 
it had to remain minimally faithful to both substantive 
legal doctrine and the methodological constraints im-
posed by legal reasoning. Within these constraints, the 
ECJ successfully pushed the process of legal integra-
tion far beyond what the member-states had intended.
Much excellent research has been conducted since 
the publication of “Europe Before the Court,” carefully 
examining and systematically testing several of our 
propositions about the driving forces of legal integra-
tion (Stone Sweet  and Brunell 1998; Stone Sweet 
2004; Alter 2001; Conant 2002; Cichowski 2007. 2 The 
proliferation of international and regional tribunals, 
however, means that questions of how and when some 
tribunals work (in the sense of reaching decisions that 
are then complied with) and others do not are more 
important than ever. Some of the emerging literature 
tackling these questions draws on the analytical ele-
ments suggested in “Europe Before the Court,” finding 
much confirming evidence and interesting parallels. 
To take only one example, a forthcoming study 
by Judith Goldstein and Richard Steinberg traces the 
way members of the Appellate Body of the WTO Dis-
pute Settlement Mechanism have used their discre-
tion in unexpected ways to open up the dispute pro-
cess as well as to shape trade rules (Goldstein and 
Steinberg 2009). When US negotiators supported a 
shift from the GATT to WTO dispute settlement, they 
expected the new mechanism to neutrally enforce 
rules that were favored by the US and Europe.  They 
did not expect Appellate Body judges to drive trade 
liberalization holding all WTO member states to their 
treaty obligations. Just as in the EU, however, judi-
cial liberalization has become the dominant method 
of contemporary WTO liberalization. Delegation to the 
judiciary, established with the creation of the WTO, 
was accompanied by considerable “agency slack” 
(meaning room for autonomy of agents from princi-
pals). As a result, the Appellate Body has been able to 
open up the dispute process by allowing amicus cur-
iae briefs submitted by non-state actors, as well as by 
permitting private lawyers to represent governments 
in oral proceedings, despite US and EU opposition. 
Goldstein and Steinberg conclude that the shift to ju-
dicial liberalization has increased the efficiency of the 
organization and enhanced trade by freeing member 
states from capture by entrenched domestic interests.
The prying open of dispute resolution forums by 
judicial entrepreneurs,  fostering strong links between 
‘victims’ and these entrepreneurs, is also a significant 
trend in human rights protection. Kathryn Sikkink, for 
example, describes how individual judges, such as 
Judge Garzon in Spain, have become powerful drivers 
of greater regulation of human rights and in particular 
of more enforcement, notably by offering new judicial 
avenues to the victims of human rights abuses. Sikkink 
notes: “The inclusion of litigants…multiplies by hun-
dreds the number of potential actors who could inter-
vene in core human rights issues” (Sikkink 2009). Sim-
ilarly to our account, the key actors that emerge here 
are the members of a specialized community, including 
judges and transnational networks of activist lawyers; 
and the enforcement of human rights conventions 
largely occurs in domestic courts. Sikkink concludes, 
“We could think of this as an example of the ‘legal in-
tegration’ of the kind discussed by Burley and Mattli.”
Notwithstanding this mounting evidence regard-
ing the power of independent tribunals, rationalists 
following in the footsteps of Geoffrey Garrett continue 
to insist that states know what they are getting into 
when they create such tribunals and judges end up 
fulfilling state expectations, playing little or no inde-
pendent role. The most recent entry in this category is 
by Eric Posner and John Yoo, who argue that the only 
effective international tribunals are “dependent” tri-
bunals, courts closely controlled by the governments 
that establish them (Posner and Yoo 2005). Helfer and 
Slaughter point out in response that Posner and Yoo’s 
own empirical figures actually support the opposite 
of their claim, showing that independent tribunals are 
the most effective (Helfer and Slaughter 2005).  Helfer 
and Slaughter’s analysis builds directly on ours and 
on Helfer and Slaughter’s later article, “Toward a The-
ory of Effective Supranational Adjudication” (1997). 
Scholars will continue to identify and debate the 
precise factors that explain the relative effectiveness 
of different tribunals. From our perspective, however, 
what is most important was our excavation of the mi-
cro-foundations of compliance with judicial decisions, 
the penetration below the façade of “state” compliance 
with international decisions to the emergence of specif-
ic constituencies of individuals—clients, lawyers, and 
judges—who benefit from appealing to a supranation-
al tribunal and complying with its decisions. We also 
continue to insist that the judges, lawyers, and litigants 
that drive legal integration forward are semi-autono-
mous actors but never rogue actors. They accept, as a 
professional and often as a moral matter, the discipline 
and culture of resolving conflicts based on language, 
logic, and underlying principles. In the right structures 
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and with the right incentives, they can hold states 
to their word, both in Europe and around the world. 
Anne-Marie Slaughter is the Bert G. Kerstetter ‘66 
University Professor of Politics and International 
Affairs and current Dean of the Woodrow Wilson 
School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton 
University.
Walter Mattli is the Fellow in Politics at St. John’s 
College and Professor of International Political Econ-
omy in the Department of Politics and International 
Relations at Oxford University.
Notes
1 The Project on International Courts and Tribunals 
has documented the “exponential growth” of inter-
national and regional judicial entities, including new 
“hybrid” courts that include both national and interna-
tional judges.  http://www.pict-pcti.org/. See also es-
says in Goldstein et al 2001; Mattli and Woods 2009; 
Alter 2006.
2 For an excellent review of the voluminous literature 
on legal integration, see Conant 2007.
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 The European Union Studies Association invites scholars and practitioners engaged in the study of Europe and the 
European Union to submit panel and paper proposals for its 2009 Eleventh Biennial International Conference, April 23-25 
in Los Angeles, California. This conference also marks the 20th anniversary of EUSA. The Program Committee plans 
to promote the broadest possible exchange of theoretical approaches, disciplinary perspectives and research agendas. 
Please note the following:
1. On the basics of paper and panel proposals:
• We welcome both paper and panel proposals, particularly those that foster transatlantic dialogue. Panel proposals 
need to consist of three to four papers.
• Participants are limited to two appearances on the conference program (two papers or one paper and one discus-
sant role; chair roles do not count toward the appearance limit). Participants should therefore submit no more than two 
proposals.
• For organizational reasons, the program is subdivided into six substantive sections (integration theory, institutions, 
economics and political economy, political sociology, law and public policy, external relations). Please indicate for 
which section you would like to be considered. Note that there is no fixed number of panels for each section. Choos-
ing one section rather than another does not enhance or diminish your chances of having your paper or panel ac-
cepted.
2. On a new presentational format for EUSA 2009:
• For papers that we judge meritorious but which cannot be included in regular panels, we will offer a new format 
instead of poster sessions. In two time-slots during the conference (on Friday and Saturday morning) several papers 
will be grouped in thematic “workshops” around a round table. Presenters will give extremely brief (3-4 minute) state-
ments and then move to discussion. Multiple workshops will run concurrently in a large room, such that visitors can 
move around and sit in on discussions. Our hope is that this format will preserve some of the openness of poster ses-
sions but will provide more substantive interaction. 
3. Teaching workshops:
• EUSA offers two time slots for teaching workshops during the conference. For more information, please refer to 
the call for teaching workshops that will be published separately.
4. Other conditions:
• The Program Committee reserves the right to make changes to organized panel proposals, including their compo-
sition.
• You do not need to be an EUSA member to submit a proposal, but all those appearing on the conference program 
must be current EUSA members.
• We cannot honor individual scheduling requests; by submitting a proposal you agree to be available from 8:30 
a.m. on Thursday, April 23rd through 6:00 p.m. on Saturday, April 25th.
The 2009 Program Committee is:
Frank Schimmelfennig (ETH Zurich), Chair
Lisa Conant (University of Denver), Law and Public Policy
Matthew Gabel (Washington University in St. Louis), Political Sociology
Michel Gueldry (Monterey Institute of International Studies), Teaching Workshops
Mark Hallerberg (Hertie School of Governance and Emory University), Economics and Political Economy
Joseph Jupille (University of Colorado), Institutions
Craig Parsons (University of Oregon), Integration Theory
Michael E. Smith (University of St. Andrews), External Relations
The firm deadline for receipt of paper and panel proposals is September 30, 2008. We regret that we cannot con-
sider proposals received after this date. You will be notified of the Program Committee’s decision regarding your proposal 
by December 15, 2008.
How to submit a paper or panel proposal: All proposals must be submitted via our online proposal submission forms, 
which will be located at www.eustudies.org beginning August 4, 2008. Proposals must be submitted via the website. 
We do not accept proposals by e-mail, regular mail or via facsimile. Address all questions about the proposal process to 
eusa@pitt.edu or by telephone to 412.648.7635.
EUSA BIENNIAL CONFERENCE
April 23-25, 2009 
Call for papers and panels
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The European Union Studies Association invites proposals for teaching workshops on 
Europe and the European Union in connection with its 2009 Eleventh Biennial 
International Conference in Los Angeles. 
The teaching workshops are scheduled for Thursday, 23 April 2009 from 8:30 to 12:30 
am and Saturday, 25 April 2009 from 2 pm to 6 pm. Workshops may be planned for two 
hours or four hours and may be offered on Thursday as well as Saturday. The purpose of 
these workshops is to provide participants with tools, methods, materials, sources and 
approaches to teaching the European Union. They should be pragmatic and concrete in 
nature.
Applications for teaching workshops should be sent to eusa@pitt.edu in PDF format. 
The deadline is September 30, 2008.
Applications should include the following information: 
x Target audience: We encourage teaching workshops designed to attract broad and/or 
diverse audiences including high school, community college, and university teachers 
(undergraduate and graduate levels). 
x Maximum participant size of the workshop 
x Preferred time slot 
x Detailed workshop description:  Please include a preliminary teaching plan with 
timetable, subjects, methods, and short reading list. Please describe the expected 
benefits of workshop for participants, including materials, concrete deliverables and 
skills that they can expect to use in the classroom 
x Workshop teachers are encouraged to consider a wide range of active and 
experimental tools, including (but not limited to): use of case studies, simulated 
negotiations and role playing, IT/multimedia and teaching the EU, integration of 
visual and audio sources, use of primary sources, field and service learning, role of 
languages in EU studies, team-teaching, etc. 
x Workshop may address issues such as: classroom activities and techniques, syllabus 
development, student’s evaluation, curriculum development and program assessment, 
etc.
x List of needed didactical equipment 
x Workshop budget: Please detail teachers’ remuneration, cost of equipment, cost of 
materials, etc.  
x CV(s) of responsible teacher(s) 
You will be notified of the Program Committee’s decision regarding your teaching 
workshop proposal by December 15, 2008. Please address all questions about the 
proposal process to eusa@pitt.edu or by telephone to 412.648.7635.
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Early history
When assessing the process of European financial 
integration, it is important to keep in the mind the situa-
tion at the end of the 1950s, when the Rome Treaty was 
negotiated. At that time, there were very significant dif-
ferences between the financial systems of the countries 
of the European Community (Maes, 2007). They con-
cerned, for instance, the role of the government, the size 
of the various financial markets, the role of different types 
of financial institutions or the significance of institutional 
investors. In several countries, financial systems were 
characterised by significant degrees of segmentation, 
leading even to the question whether one could speak 
of a “national” financial market (CEC, 1966). Moreover, 
capital controls were pervasive, leading to a significant 
partitioning of financial markets between countries. 
A crucial element was that the financial sector was 
regarded as a very special sector in which the govern-
ment had an important role. This was to a large extent 
a legacy of the interwar period, when bank runs, stock 
market crashes and the Great Depression had led to 
significant government intervention in the financial 
sector. Crucial objectives of the government were the 
protection of small savers and the prevention of sys-
temic financial crises. The government intervened in 
a multitude of ways: different forms of regulation (like 
the prohibition of banks to take shares in industry), the 
creation of institutions which were responsible for the 
supervision of the financial sector (in the United States, 
for instance, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
was established in 1934), government financial institu-
tions providing market financial services (mostly to pro-
vide credit to a specific group which was considered 
to be neglected by the financial markets). The situa-
tion was concisely summarised in the Segré Report: 
“The way available resources are distributed between 
the various sectors… depends essentially on decisions 
taken by the authorities. The scale of public investment, 
the major role played by official financial intermediaries 
and the dominant position on the market held by the 
public authorities leave only a relatively small area in 
which the play of traditional market forces can deter-
mine the allocation of resources” (CEC, 1966, p. XV). 
Financial integration was not the topic of a sepa-
rate chapter of the Rome Treaty. It involves three dif-
ferent types of activities (which are the subject of 
three different chapters of the Treaty): the right of 
establishment, the free movement of services and 
the free movement of capital (Servais, 1996). While 
these three activities are strongly interrelated, it is 
important to keep in mind that they are conceptu-
ally different. Let us give a short definition of them:
- the concept of establishment involves (a 
financial institution) setting up permanent-
EUSA Economics Interest Section
Essay
Half a Century of European 
Financial Integration
Ivo Maes
this article traces the development of half a century of 
European financial integration, from the Rome Treaty 
to the 21st century. While it focuses on the process of 
European financial integration, it is important to keep 
in mind that European financial integration has never 
been an end in itself (Maes, 2007). It has been part 
of the general process of European integration, a fun-
damental political process, to restore peace and pros-
perity after the destructions of the Second World War. 
One of the crucial aims of the Member States of the 
European Community, as expressed in the Preamble of 
the Rome Treaty, was “to ensure the economic and so-
cial progress of their countries by common action in elim-
inating barriers which divide Europe.” Financial integra-
tion certainly played an important role hereby, not only 
in eliminating barriers which divided Europe, but also in 
contributing to economic and social progress. Indeed, a 
well functioning financial sector is important for a strong 
economic performance. It is crucial for the process of 
“creative destruction,” reallocating capital from declin-
ing sectors to those with good economic prospects. 
This was put very forcefully in the Conclusions of the 
2000 Lisbon European Council: “Efficient and transpar-
ent financial markets foster growth and employment by 
better allocation of capital and reducing its cost. They 
therefore play an essential role in fuelling new ideas, 
supporting entrepreneurial culture and promoting ac-
cess to and use of new technologies.” However, while 
financial integration has clear benefits, one has also to 
admit that it can entail certain risks. So observed the 
Committee of Wise Men (2001) that, while it “strongly 
believes that large, deep, liquid and innovative finan-
cial markets will result in substantial efficiency gains 
and will therefore bring individual benefits to European 
citizens, it also believes that greater efficiency does not 
necessarily go hand in hand with enhanced stability.”
During this last half century, the process of Euro-
pean financial integration has largely been driven by 
three different, but interacting, factors: (1) a global, 
world-wide process of financial integration, very much 
market driven; (2) policy initiatives towards European 
(financial) integration at the level of the European Union 
as a whole (with the Rome Treaty, the single market 
project and the 1999 Financial Services Action Plan 
as the main highlights); and (3) the introduction of the 
euro and the single monetary policy, adopted by many, 
but not all, of the countries of the European Union.
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ly in a Member State, other than the coun-
try of origin, in order to exercise activities;
- the free movement of services means 
the supply of services, by an establish-
ment located in one country, for the 
benefit of a client in another country;
- a capital movement implies a transfer of as
sets from one country to another (or, if it is within 
a Member State, to a non-resident). Moreover, 
it has to be an independent transaction in its 
own right (otherwise, it would be a payment).
That financial integration did not enjoy the same 
priority in the Rome Treaty as the customs union is 
clear from the chapter on the free movement of capital. 
The first article of which states: "Member States shall, 
in the course of the transitional period and to the ex-
tent necessary for the proper functioning of the Com-
mon Market, progressively abolish as between them-
selves restrictions on the movement of capital." (Article 
67.1). The Treaty thus clearly subordinates the free 
movement of capital to the common market (compris-
ing free movement of goods and foreign direct invest-
ment, cf. Vigneron, 2007). Abolishing barriers to trade 
in goods was already a highly ambitious objective, and 
was made subject to Article 109’s safeguard clause. 
Furthermore, Article 73 stipulates that in “the event of 
movements of capital leading to disturbances in the 
functioning of the capital market in any Member State,” 
the country concerned can take “protective measures”.
Moreover, the Rome Treaty left macroeconomic and 
monetary policy-making mainly at the level of the Member 
States. Triffin (1958, p.1) described the limited monetary 
dimension of the Rome Treaty as “a Hamlet in which the 
role of the Prince of Denmark is almost totally ignored.”
The first directive concerning the liberalization 
of capital movements was adopted by the Council in 
May 1960. It fell far short of full liberalization. Mem-
ber countries were obliged to unconditionally liberal-
ize short and medium-term trade-related credits, direct 
investment flows, and transactions in listed shares. 
These were the financial transactions which were di-
rectly related to the physical creation of the common 
market. They were directly linked to the clause in Ar-
ticle 67, ‘to ensure the proper functioning of the Com-
mon Market’. Short-term financial transactions, how-
ever, did not fall under any obligation to liberalize. A 
second directive, much less important, was adopted 
by the Council in December 1962. The main element 
was the extension of the unconditional liberalization 
of short- and medium-term credits to trade in servic-
es (as opposed to goods only in the 1960 directive).
Meanwhile however, the first cracks in the Bretton-
Woods system had appeared. From the end of the 
1960s the Bretton-Woods fixed exchange rate system 
was increasingly under stress (Maes, 2006). Also in the 
EEC itself, cracks began to appear in the exchange rate 
system. The after-effects of the May 1968 revolt caused 
great difficulty for the French franc. Consequently, the 
French government decided to use the safeguard 
clause and took temporary protectionist measures. 
During the early 1970s, in a context of turbulence 
on the foreign exchange markets, the European coun-
tries resorted again to capital controls in order to defend 
their exchange rates (Bakker, 1996). Even Germany, 
very much against its free market views, introduced 
measures to limit capital inflows. Also other countries, 
especially France and Italy, introduced capital con-
trols. However, in these last two countries, they were 
essentially aimed at the control of capital outflows, 
as their currencies were under downward pressure.
New impulses
In the 1970s and the 1980s, the financial land-
scape went through fundamental changes, “both a 
quantitative and a qualitative jump” (Abraham, 2003). 
Two tendencies were crucial: the internationalisation of 
the financial markets and financial innovations. It went 
together with a growing influence of market forces.
The internationalisation of the financial markets 
was most evident in the growth of the so-called Eu-
rocurrency markets. As such, Eurocurrencies were 
not a significant product innovation. Indeed, opera-
tions in foreign currency deposits were well known 
in London before World War One (Toniolo, 2005). At 
the core of the euro-markets was the eurodollar mar-
ket. Eurodollars, in Milton Friedman's (1969) classical 
definition, “are deposit liabilities, denominated in dol-
lars, of banks outside the United States.” However, 
there were also euro-markets for deposits denomi-
nated in other currencies, like the Deutsche mark, the 
pound sterling or the Swiss franc. The prefix “euro” de-
rived from the fact that banks originally active in this 
market were located in European financial centres.
From the 1970s onwards, financial innovations start-
ed flourishing, especially on the international financial 
scene. Besides the sharp acceleration in the globalisa-
tion of financial markets, two broad tendencies can be 
distinguished (BIS, 1986). Firstly, a move towards secu-
ritisation, with banks trying to increase the marketability 
of their assets. This contributed to a blurring of the dis-
tinction between bank credits and the capital markets. 
Secondly, an increasing importance of off-balance-
sheet items. The BIS report here paid special attention 
to four major instruments: note issuance facilities, which 
enable a borrower to issue a stream of short-term notes 
over a medium-term period, and three types of derivative 
products: currency and interest rate swaps, currency 
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and interest rate options and forward rate agreements. 
Also, attitudes towards risk capital were changing. 
In several European countries the idea was growing that 
the aversion of savers towards shares was contributing 
to a weak financial structure of firms, making them much 
more vulnerable to averse economic circumstances. In 
France, the Barre government passed, in July 1978, 
the so-called “Monory law” (after Finance Minister René 
Monory). It provided tax incentives for French house-
holds when they acquired shares of French companies, 
and for certain firms (especially medium-sized compa-
nies) when they issued new shares. A crucial aim of the 
law was to redirect savings from short-term financial 
assets towards risk capital. Moreover, the law crucially 
aimed at reinforcing the role of market forces in the 
French financial system, which was very segmented and 
oligopolistic (Métais, 1985). In the following years, sev-
eral other European countries took similar measures.
Naturally, with the growing internationalisation of fi-
nancial markets and the accelerating pace of financial 
innovations, the effectiveness of capital controls became 
more and more eroded (Maes, 2007). Also, and very cru-
cially, free and open financial markets were increasingly 
seen as important determinants of the competitiveness 
of financial centres and financial institutions. Moreover, 
with the Thatcher government, the free market camp in 
the European Community was significantly strengthened. 
Financial integration came effectively on the agen-
da of the Community with the single market project in 
1985. In its “White Paper,” the Commission (1985, p. 
27) clearly stated, “The liberalisation of financial ser-
vices, linked to that of capital movements, will rep-
resent a major step towards Community financial in-
tegration and the widening of the Internal Market.”
As regards the freedom of establishment of finan-
cial institutions and the cross-border selling of finan-
cial products, two issues were of crucial importance: 
supervision and consumer protection. Differences 
between countries in these areas had formed signifi-
cant barriers to a single financial market. The Com-
mission’s 1992 strategy aimed to abolish barriers 
through three major principles: (1) minimum coordi-
nation of individual national rules; (2) mutual recog-
nition; and (3) home-country control (CEC, 1989).
The internal market programme adopted this ap-
proach for the financial sector (banking, insurance and 
the securities markets). Four key directives defined 
the provisions that had to be harmonized in order to 
allow the free provision of financial services: the Sec-
ond Banking Directive; the Investment Services Direc-
tive; and new Life and Non-Life Insurance Directives. 
In essence, these directives gave financial institu-
tions the opportunity to offer their services across the 
EU with a single licence (Gros and Lannoo, 2000). It 
marked the start of the quest for a single passport. 
The measures were supplemented by directives de-
fining specific subjects, such as the solvency ratio 
and own funds directives in banking, and directives 
covering unit trusts, listing prospectuses and initial 
public offerings, in the area of investment services.
As mentioned earlier, the liberalisation of capi-
tal movements was closely linked with monetary and 
exchange rate issues. This would also be so in the 
1980s. In May 1986, in order to put into practice the 
White Paper on the internal market, the Commission 
presented a programme for the complete liberalisa-
tion of capital movements. It would go ahead, along 
with the relaunching of the monetary union project 
(Maes, 2002). The Maastricht Treaty not only con-
tained EMU, but put also the free movement of capital 
on a par with the other freedoms of the Rome Treaty.
The euro and recent initiatives
The introduction of the euro and the single monetary 
policy have had a particularly strong impact on the fi-
nancial markets. A significant integration process is un-
der way, as seen most clearly in the money market and 
above all in the unsecured interbank market (Hartmann 
et al., 2003). One can refer in this regard to a genuine 
single European market that is the direct result of the 
common monetary policy. Moreover, the disappear-
ance of exchange rate risk within the euro area and the 
integration of the money market also provided a great 
boost to the integration of the other financial markets 
(ECB, 2007). A sector in which impressive changes 
have taken place is the euro denominated bond market. 
With the removal of exchange rate risk and the in-
troduction of the euro, yields in the government bond 
market have converged in the euro area, although the 
importance of national factors has not completely dis-
appeared. These relate in part to the characteristics 
of the markets in the different countries. Differences 
in liquidity and the availability of developed deriva-
tives markets may partly account for the yield differ-
entials. However, bond yields also reflect differences 
in perceived credit risk, which ought not, of course, to 
be seen as indicating a lack of integration. The con-
solidation of public finances under the influence of 
the convergence criteria and the Stability and Growth 
Pact has also contributed to a decline in credit risk 
premia and hence to a convergence of bond yields. 
The introduction of the euro also contributed, to-
gether with the globalization of the economy, to chang-
es in the behaviour of stock market investors as well 
as issuers of shares. Investors in shares traditionally 
adopted a “country” perspective, as the determinants 
of share prices (profits of firms and interest rates) were 
strongly shaped by country-specific factors like the 
evolution of the business cycle and national monetary 
policies. As we saw above, money market rates and 
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bond yields have both converged significantly since the 
introduction of the euro. Greater synchronization can 
also be observed in the business cycle, due in part to 
the single monetary policy. National determinants of 
share prices are thus losing in importance and inves-
tors are increasingly adopting a euro area and global 
perspective. In more general terms, they are attach-
ing greater importance to a sector-based allocation 
of shares, as profits depend to a significant extent on 
the evolution of the sector in which the firm operates.
Moreover, the stock exchanges were undergoing 
fundamental changes (Lefebvre, 1999). From a “club,” 
were members would meet, they were increasingly 
transformed into electronic trading platforms. So, their 
role as “infrastructure providers” for intermediaries on 
the financial markets was more and more accentuat-
ed. Moreover, stock exchanges were becoming busi-
nesses on their own. Often they were “demutualised,” 
with their own shares also listed on the exchange and 
their capital opened up to non members. Mostly, their 
supervisory functions, like the investigation of market 
abuse, were transferred to public authorities. In these 
transformations, technology was playing a driving role. 
Furthermore, as electronic trading platforms imply mas-
sive fixed costs, economies of scale are becoming ever 
more important, a crucial driver for a consolidation of 
the exchanges. Also, the product of a stock exchange 
is the liquidity that it provides for the shares which are 
traded. This depends very much on the accessibility of 
the exchange, with a better accessibility leading to high-
er liquidity. So, network externalities are important, an-
other crucial driver for a consolidation of the exchanges. 
In the banking markets, the wholesale market and 
capital market related activities are displaying significant 
signs of increasing integration, whereas the retail mar-
kets remain fragmented (ECB, 2007). The introduction 
of the euro removed one of the barriers between nation-
al markets. What’s more, together with growing compe-
tition and globalization, the euro is contributing to more 
aggressive bank strategies in Europe (Abraham, 1998). 
The low level of retail banking integration reflects barri-
ers such as differences in legal frameworks and practic-
es (e.g. consumer protection and mortgages); traditions 
and culture; and technical infrastructure (e.g. relatively 
high fragmentation in retail payment infrastructures).
So, the introduction of the euro acted as a power-
ful catalyst for the creation of an integrated European 
financial market. At the same time, it led to a greater 
awareness of the existence of other barriers and of 
the need to eliminate them. Consequently, public au-
thorities in the European Union took several initiatives 
to push forward the process of financial integration. 
The Cardiff European Council of June 1998 placed 
the functioning of markets at the center of the economic 
reform process. In the spring of 1999, the European 
Commission adopted the Financial Services Action Plan 
(CEC, 1999). The FSAP aimed to tackle three strategic 
objectives: (1) a Single Market for wholesale financial 
services; (2) open and secure retail markets; and (3) state 
of the art prudential rules and supervision. Moreover, it 
foresaw “flanking measures,” especially in the area of 
taxation. The FSAP contained a set of 42 concrete mea-
sures which had to be implemented in a five year period. 
A key issue of the FSAP was the functioning of the 
securities markets, especially how to adapt the Euro-
pean regulatory framework to the continuously evolving 
financial markets. In July 2000, the ECOFIN Council 
appointed an ad hoc Committee of Wise Men, led by 
Alexandre Lamfalussy, the first President of the Euro-
pean Monetary Institute, to analyse “practical arrange-
ments for implementation of the Communtiy rules” and 
“propose various approaches to adjusting the practice 
of regulation and cooperation between regulators.” 
The Committee of Wise Men proposed an overhaul 
of the institutional arrangements for the regulation of 
the securities markets. The new procedure made a 
clear distinction between key political decisions and 
technical implementation. The crucial aim was to speed 
up changes in regulation. Moreover, it significantly in-
creased the transparency of the regulatory process 
and extended greatly private sector consultation (Qua-
glia, 2007). The approach of the Committee of Wise 
Men was broadly accepted by the European Council of 
Stockholm of March 2001. In 2002 followed an overhaul 
of the institutional arrangements for banking and insur-
ance. This extended the Lamfalussy approach to bank-
ing, insurance & pensions, and financial conglomerates. 
In the following years, the Commission further con-
sidered its strategy. A key idea was that less emphasis 
should be placed on new regulation, but that the trans-
position and enforcement of existing measures should 
be privileged. In December 2005, the Commission is-
sued a White Paper on Financial Services Policy (CEC, 
2005). This set the agenda for the period 2005 2010. The 
White Paper gave a high priority to a timely and consis-
tent implementation of the FSAP, as well as to continu-
ous ex post evaluation of existing policies and rules. It 
argued also that certain areas required further policy 
efforts: (1) clearing and settlement, where cross border 
clearing and settlement transactions are far more costly 
than domestic transactions, due to technical, legal and 
fiscal obstacles; (2) the retail sector, a clear priority for 
the Commission, with important initiatives in the areas 
of mortgage credit, consumer credit and payment ser-
vices; (3) EU supervisory arrangements; (4) the invest-
ment fund industry; and (5) a new EU framework for 
risk management in the insurance sector (Solvency II).
Conclusion
Looking back after half a century, one sees that Eu-
rope's financial landscape has changed tremendously, 
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becoming unrecognisable compared to half a century 
ago. On the level of the wholesale markets, financial in-
tegration has progressed most, even if certain barriers 
remain, especially ones related to clearing and settle-
ment. Furthermore, on the level of the retail markets, 
where less progress has been made, there is scope 
for further action. This is not really surprising, as re-
tail markets are even more embedded in their national 
societies, with their traditions, languages, cultures and 
legal systems (especially regarding the protection of 
savers and mortgages). It is remarkable that also for 
the introduction of the euro a distinction was made be-
tween “wholesale” and “retail” markets. While the euro 
was officially introduced on 1 January 1999, de facto, 
it was mainly used on the wholesale financial markets. 
Mainly because of logistical challenges, banknotes 
and coins were only introduced three years later.
Financial integration is a complex process (Maes, 
2007). A financial system reflects the socio-economic 
preferences of a country. These preferences are em-
bodied in legal frameworks, taxation systems or regu-
latory requirements. Removing barriers to integration 
is then a little bit like playing with a Russian doll: it is 
only after the removal of a barrier, that one really sees 
the significance of the next barrier. Moreover, there are 
important political economy aspects, as costs and ben-
efits of integration are not evenly distributed. The tran-
sition costs have usually to be borne upfront and tend 
to be concentrated, while the benefits are more widely 
spread. It then often happens that potential losers “wrap 
their defence of the status quo in nationalistic rhetoric, 
appealing to protectionist impulses” (Almunia, 2006).
A crucial challenge is certainly the future of Eu-
rope's supervisory arrangements. As remarked by 
European Commissioner McCreevy (2007), “Europe's 
supervisory system seems to be creaking under its 
own weight.” Concerns are expressed regarding both 
efficiency and stability aspects. Financial operators 
are complaining about the costs of complying with so 
many supervisory structures and practices. Moreover, 
from a financial stability perspective, the framework 
has been described as a “mind-boggling patchwork” by 
Lamfalussy (2003), who further advocates a strength-
ening of its crisis-prevention and crisis-fighting capa-
bilities. But it is also necessary to widen the horizon: 
financial integration is more and more a global phe-
nomenon. Financial markets are more and more inter-
connected in real time. The institutional and regulatory 
framework has to take this into account. Europe's ex-
perience in financial integration will be a valuable as-
set in creating transatlantic and global arrangements.
Ivo Maes, National Bank of Belgium and Robert Triffin 
Chair, Université catholique de Louvain
Note: the usual restrictions apply. 
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Nominations for the European Union Studies Associ-
ation (EUSA) Executive Committee election are now 
being accepted. Three seats are open for the 2009 
election, to be elected to four-year terms. 
The seven members of the Executive Committee 
meet once a year, determine Association policies, 
and oversee activities including the Review, Prizes, 
EUSA's website and listserve, interest sections, and 
the Biennial Conference. 
Nominations (self-nominations accepted) must in-
clude:
(1) a letter of interest;
(2) current curriculum vita (short version preferred);
(3) one brief biographical paragraph not to exceed 
100 words (for use with the ballot);
Executive Committee members must be current 
members of EUSA who have not already served 
eight years total on the Committee. EUSA welcomes 
all qualified candidates, including those from outside 
academia. It is hoped that the final slate will be char-
acterized by a balance among senior and junior level 
candidates, among minority and women candidates, 
as well as a cross-representation of academic disci-
plines, colleges and universities, and geographical 
locations.
All nomination materials should be sent by email to 
the Executive Director, Joe Figliulio, at eusa@pitt.
edu. Deadline for receipt of materials is July 1, 2008. 
A ballot will be mailed to all current EUSA members 
by 1 September 2008, and ballots will be due by 
October 15, 2008. 
Election results will be announced early November 
2008. The three new Executive Committee members 
will take office on April 26, 2009, at the EUSA Confer-
ence in Los Angeles.
EUSA Executive Committee Election
Call for Nominations
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EUSA members interested in reviewing re-
cent EU- related books, please contact the 
reviews editor:
Dr. Andrew Smith
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E-mail  a.smith@sciencespobordeaux.fr
Fax 56 84 43 29
Publishers should send two review copies 
of books directly to Dr. Smith.
Book Reviews
Beate Sissenich. Building States without Society: 
European Union Enlargement and the Transfer of EU 
Social Policy to Poland and Hungary. Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2007. 
based on extensive empirical research conducted in Hun-
gary, Poland and Brussels Beate Sissenich’s new book 
sheds new light on the process of EU enlargement, 
transnational rule transfer and cross-border networks 
of actors in the field of social policy. The author tackles 
some inescapable questions of the European studies 
dealing with the EU Eastern enlargement process con-
cluded in 2004.  Concerning the mechanisms of rule 
transfer, two are identified and discussed: conditional-
ity and social learning. Although both logics are analyt-
ically separated in the introductive chapters which dis-
cuss different scenarios of rule adoption, according to 
the author they are not mutually exclusive in practice. 
Concerning the effectiveness of this transfer, the 
puzzle studied is the following: as a strongly institu-
tionalised and integrated system, acting in condi-
tions of power asymmetry, the EU did not manage 
to impose all the provisions of its social policy frame-
work even upon the two apparently most advanced 
candidate countries (Hungary and Poland). EU so-
cial policy, and especially its social dialogue, was 
expected to reinforce stakeholder participation in 
policy-making at the domestic level. As far as the ac-
tors of norm diffusion are concerned, Sissenich ex-
amines whether the EU did empower – as expected 
–non state actors to search for leverage at the Euro-
pean level and thus reinforce their position vis-à-vis 
central governments. The answer is negative. As in 
other areas which have been analysed elsewhere in 
the same context, such as the relations between the 
centre and the periphery, EU enlargement appears to 
have been an elite-driven process, which has failed 
to alter – and has sometimes even bolstered – top-
down styles of policy-making at the domestic level. 
Mapping the structure of networks, including the 
relevant social policy organisations in both analysed 
countries, Sissenich discovers some important find-
ings. While the EU shaped these networks by support-
ing interest organisations in the candidate states, Pol-
ish and Hungarian actors multiplied their respective 
ties with Brussels without interacting with their counter-
parts in any other country. Thus the growing centrality 
of Brussels did not trigger any stronger mobilisation of 
stakeholders to strengthen the social dialogue. More-
over, both countries undertook minimal legal harmoni-
sation of EU secondary legislation related to labour 
relations, equal treatment or workplace health and 
safety. To explain why the interactions between the EU 
and the candidate countries’ state and non state ac-
tors did not exceed discursive and formal adaptation, 
two factors are pinpointed: insufficient state capacity 
and the weakness of organised interests in the target 
countries. The question this reader has is whether this 
explanation, built on aggregated data advanced by 
other scholars, could be further refined. Instead of lim-
iting the argumentation to dichotomies (strong/weak 
state, vibrant/absent society), it would be interesting 
to learn more about the actors of the sectors analysed 
(rule entrepreneurs or innovators) who tried to influ-
ence the outcome of enlargement negotiations in both 
countries. The author engages several proximate ex-
planations, such as the absence of a single model of 
industrial relations and social dialogue in EU member 
states or the fact that social policy was not a priority 
chapter of the accession negotiations for EU officials. 
As these factors determine the feeble determinacy and 
credibility of rules, their analysis could be deepened. 
Other factors are mentioned only marginally although 
they seem crucial to understanding the absence of 
mobilization of labour and employer representatives. 
Social dialogue was not a salient electoral issue either 
in the candidate or in the member states, unlike unem-
ployment or the free movement of workers. Much more 
could also be said about the role of foreign investors 
and multinational corporations in East-Central Europe, 
who were far more concerned about increasing mar-
ket liberalisation and keeping the trade unions weak 
than by introducing high social standards. Finally, the 
date selection for the network analysis is not entirely 
convincing. For example the fact that twelve Hungar-
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ian and only four Polish non state actors are taken into 
consideration leads to the exclusion of Polish agricul-
tural and manufacturers associations from the sample.
In summary, Sissenich’s book offers useful evi-
dence about the shortcomings of EU rule transfer in 
the context of enlargement. It would be tempting to 
add that the demonstration also shows up the limits 
of deductive conditionality models. Refined explana-
tions taking into account both old and new member 
states could be of greater assistance in grasping 
the diversity behind the European “social model”. 
Dorota Dakowska
Institut d’études politiques de Strasbourg
Paolo Foradori, Paolo Rosa, and Riccardo 
Scartezzini (eds.). Managing a Multilevel Foreign 
Policy: The EU in International Affairs. Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2007.
managing a multilevel foreign policy is an edited col-
lection of essays on European foreign policy (EFP) 
written by a number of leading experts.  The title of 
the volume is somewhat misleading: it is not really 
about “managing” EFP (i.e., decision-making, stra-
tegic direction, policy entrepreneurship, etc.) but 
mainly an overview of current themes in EFP, with 
a stress on security issues.  There is therefore very 
little discussion of other aspects of EFP, such as 
economics, development, environmental issues, en-
ergy, human rights, and so on.  Although the volume 
also lacks an overarching theoretical or conceptual 
framework applied across the chapters, some of the 
chapters offer novel insights into the contemporary 
study of EFP that could be developed into more ex-
plicit theoretical propositions or research agendas.
The short introductory chapter by the editors 
addresses the “system” of EFP and takes a much 
broader view of the topic than is reflected by the in-
dividual thematic chapters.  It begins with a standard 
discussion of intergovernmentalism and neo-func-
tionalism, then presents a more general framework, 
also largely drawn from the work of other researchers, 
for analyzing EFP policy types, key actors, and de-
cision-making processes.  This system also includes 
processes such as Europeanization, socialization, 
and Brusselisation, all of which have been developed 
elsewhere in the literature.  The rest of the chapter 
briefly discusses the individual chapter contribu-
tions, which are organized into three major sections.
Part I, “The EU in International Affairs,” includes 
chapters by Christopher Hill (on the future of the 
EU as a global actor), Emil Kirchner (on EU secu-
rity governance), and Anton Pelinka (on European 
political parties and EFP).  Hill is especially insight-
ful in terms of the growing complexities of the “soft 
vs. hard” power dimensions of EFP, while Kirchner 
suggests a useful framework for analyzing these 
forms of power in light of the EU’s expanding secu-
rity agenda.  Virtually all of the EU’s institutionalized 
relationships now involve some aspects of security so 
it clearly makes sense to move well beyond a state-
centric, militaristic view of European security as found 
in traditional alliance theory.  Pelinka’s chapter fo-
cuses on the lack of trans-European political parties 
as a key factor behind the weakness of EFP, yet it is 
questionable whether the advent of a European party 
system would provide more coherence and effective-
ness to EFP given the limited parliamentary input 
into foreign policy at both the national and EU levels.
Part II of the volume covers the EU and Interre-
gional Relations and includes chapters by Luk Van 
Langenhove and Ana-Christina Costea (on the emer-
gence of ‘Third Generation’ regionalism); Fulvio Attinà 
(on the European Security Partnership), William Kin-
cade (on differing EU and U.S. approaches to inter-
national terrorism), and Vittorio Emanuele Parsi (on 
post-Iraq transatlantic relations).  The emphasis on the 
more pro-active externalization of the EU’s own priori-
ties as a key feature of “Third generation” regionalism 
is especially interesting, as is Attinà’s chapter on the 
European Security Partnership, which has some obvi-
ous parallel’s with Kirchner’s approach.  More dialogue 
between these chapters, particularly in terms of how 
each author defines “Europe” as a region and as a set 
of governance problems, would have been very useful.
Part III of the volume deals with “Areas of Inter-
vention” and includes chapters by Giovanna Bono 
(on EU approaches to conflict management), Harald 
Müller (on the proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction), and James Sperling, (on the future of the 
transatlantic alliance).  As with Parts I and II, these 
chapters are heavily security-oriented and pay much 
attention to distinguishing the EU’s views from those of 
other key players, particularly the U.S.  Bono’s chap-
ter continues the discussion of the complex balance 
between soft and hard power raised in Hill’s chapter, 
and extends this to debates over the EU as a “civi-
lizing force” in light of the emerging “responsibility to 
protect.”  Müller’s chapter examines the EU’s difficul-
ties in dealing with states such as Iraq and Iran, and 
Sperling returns to the traditional theme of NATO-EU 
alliance politics, including the questions of enlarge-
ment and task expansion/change in each institution.
Overall Managing a Multilevel Foreign Policy is 
similar to other edited collections on EFP that appear 
on a regular basis.  Although it pays much attention to 
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security, transatlantic relations, and the EU’s overall 
“actorness,” in my view the core theme of the volume 
involves change, across a range of dimensions and 
with a variety of consequences.  However, rather than 
investigate this theme in detail the tone of some of the 
chapters is somewhat speculative, which seems like a 
missed opportunity to offer more rigorous development 
of concepts in favor of unfalsifiable forecasting, a com-
mon problem in volumes such as these.  It is therefore 
more useful as a teaching text rather than as a co-
herent research contribution.  Similarly, there is little 
original empirical material and no conclusion to draw 
together main themes from the individual chapters. 
Finally, the lack of an index is especially frustrating to 
those who might use this book as a research resource.
Michael E. Smith 
University of St Andrews
Naurin, D. Deliberation behind closed doors: trans-
parency and lobbying in the EU. Colchester, UK: 
ECPR Press, 2007.
in the current heat of EU transparency debates, Nau-
rin’s research asks timely and plausible questions about 
the contribution which transparency oriented mea-
sures can really make to democratic arenas.  He finds 
systematic empirical evidence of recourse to public 
interest reasoning by private interest actors in circum-
stances where such actors believed they were engag-
ing in private bi-lateral dialogue with policy makers.  He 
asks what these findings might mean for approaches 
grounded in assumptions about the supposed civilis-
ing effect of transparency, recording that ‘there is more 
uncertainty here than is usually recognised’ (p.3).   He 
develops this by summarising what is known about the 
negative externalities of transparency, drawing partic-
ular attention to the loss of problem-solving capacity 
as actors withdraw from bargaining to the trenches of 
fixed position taking, and provides a rejoinder for con-
texts where transparency is utilised as a convenient 
weapon of unqualified public good.  A highlighted con-
sequence is that, under conditions of transparency, 
private interest actors (such as representative busi-
ness associations) recourse more to self-interested 
arguments in the knowledge that their interest constit-
uency (such as firms) can monitor them, and are not 
only less willing to give way, but the systemic capacity 
for deliberative style debate is diminished.  Finally, he 
reminds us that output oriented transparency mea-
sures are no substitute for the development of sub-
stantive accountability mechanisms on the input side.
Naurin places his research as supportive of ear-
lier work in an EU context, most notably that by Jo-
erges and Neyer, which found similar evidence of 
deliberative public-interest reasoning adopted by 
private interest actors in the backstreet location of 
comitology committees where the light of transpar-
ency does not shine.   Whilst the weight of evalua-
tive commentary has been incredulous of such an 
outcome in such a context, few ‘public affairs prac-
titioners’ would be surprised about the need to em-
phasise public interest dimensions to intensely held 
private interests.  This reflects the basic realities of the 
EU system which can be overlooked at moments of 
convenience, i.e. its multi-level nature character, its 
ease of access, the absence of majoritarian politics, 
and the resulting compromise basis of public policy 
making, driving the need to broaden the constituency 
of appeal, preferably by finding legitimacy alliances. 
Naurin used the EU 2001 Access to Documents 
Regulation as both the pivotal moment of change in 
reasoning by private interest actors, and his means 
to access documentation from which to undertake 
content analysis.  A key factor lay in the interpreta-
tion of this Regulation, both to have retroactive effect 
(i.e. it was surprisingly held to apply to documents 
written before the Regulation came into effect), and to 
extend it to documentation originating from third par-
ties whereby such authors may be consulted over, but 
cannot veto, release.  These factors clearly mean that 
authors of lobbying letters could not have known of 
the likelihood of public domain release.  Naurin chose 
letters written by business actors because of the as-
sumption that these would form the most likely scenar-
io for private interest justification, and through content 
analysis found a high degree of public-spirited argu-
ments.  He compared these with similar dossier letters 
written to Swedish public administrators, where long 
established freedom of information conditions means 
that authors would have been aware of the possibility 
of their release, and found that the number of letters 
containing self-regarding justifications to be higher.
The likely corollary in an EU context is to make 
the extrapolation beyond the date when the Regu-
lation came into force of the likely subsequent re-
course to private interest justification.  This would 
however be qualified by a significant methodologi-
cal question: to what extent, and when, were the 
authors of letters aware of the Regulation?  A con-
versation with the author of a number of the letters 
obtained by Naurin (reproduced in the monograph) 
indicates a lack of knowledge of the Regulation for 
some considerable period following its introduction, 
accompanied by confirmation that the need for jus-
tificatory public interest reasoning doesn’t change.
Naurin draws comparison throughout to the Swed-
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ish tradition of transparency, against which any other 
political system can hardly be compared.  This results 
in a tendency to make normative statements about the 
general lack of transparency of the EU, which is some-
what ungenerous given the raft of measures since the 
2001 White Paper on Governance (open consultations 
and responses, web directories of experts/advisors 
etc, generous interpretation of access to documents 
measures, etc) aimed at strengthening procedural 
democracy.  Whilst these are open to somewhat dis-
missive treatment by commentators as ‘mere output’ 
measures, they lie within the realm of the achiev-
able set against the more systemic problems (for the 
EU) of input oriented political accountability devices, 
and Naurin’s analysis thus deserves wide consider-
ation.  He easily succeeds in his goal of ‘questioning 
the intuitive obviousness’ of the transparency case.
Justin Greenwood
The Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen
Beate Kohler-Koch and Berthold Rittberger (eds.). 
Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of the European 
Union. Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littleﬁeld Publish-
ers, Inc., 2007. 
THE  EU  IS  A CONTESTED  POLITY  yet its decisions have a 
direct impact on the daily lives of around 500 million 
Union citizens. This is an important and welcome 
book as it is explicitly devoted to discussing differ-
ent perspectives on European democracy. It brings 
together an impressive list of ﬁrst class EU schol-
ars with interesting and well-written contributions. 
The 13 chapters are organised around ﬁve main 
topics. The ﬁrst part deals with the constitutional jour-
ney of how the principle of democracy has become 
incorporated into the EU Treaties (Von Bogdandy). 
The second part is devoted to what role parliamentary 
democracy plays in the Union both with regard to the 
inﬂuence of national parliaments on EU policy-making 
(Auel and Benz) and the development and position of 
the European Parliament (Maurer and Rittberger), as 
well as to how a decentred polity such as the EU needs 
stakeholder networks in addition to parliamentary poli-
tics (Lord). In the third part, attention is moved from 
the level of institutions to civil society and the public 
sphere. Here it is shown how political communication 
can have an important democratising role in providing 
a catalytic effect on establishing a common European 
public space (Eder and Trenz). Social protest move-
ments can also be attributed such an effect on the EU 
level as they are no longer only targeting their demands 
towards the state, but are now pursuing multilevel strat-
egies placing demands and protests also at the Eu-
ropean level (della Porta). The fourth part addresses 
different aspects of political participation ranging from 
a discussion on the relationship between participation 
and effective policy-making (Heinelt) to an analysis of 
the concept of participatory governance (Greven) and 
a discussion on the Commission’s consultation prac-
tice (Kohler-Koch). The ﬁfth and last part contains one 
chapter reﬂecting on what kind of input deliberative 
democracy could have on the EU institutional system 
(Schmalz-Bruns) and a second on the deliberative 
supranationalist understanding where EU law can be 
seen as the legitimate adjudicator between the con-
ﬂicting systems of law in a multilevel system (Joerges).
According to the editors, the aim of the book is to: 
“...offer the reader a wide-ranging panorama of differ-
ent theoretical approaches to EU democracy, and by 
doing so we wish to stimulate a broader discourse that 
cuts across different strands of scholarship on democ-
racy and the EU.” (p. 3). The interdisciplinary charac-
ter as well as the different theoretical perspectives on 
democracy are obvious strengths of the book, yet the 
latter is also one of its weaker points in the sense that 
the chapters could have been better related to one 
another. The problem is that beyond the very gener-
al topic of democracy in the EU there is no common 
theme or research question that binds the chapters 
together and consequently supplies the book with a 
more overarching rationale. A more stringent concep-
tual framework or a concluding chapter summing up 
the ﬁndings could have integrated the various pieces 
and consequently offered an additional depth to the 
self-standing chapters. For instance, in the introduc-
tion, the editors present a three-dimensional typol-
ogy emphasising different aspects of democracy (i.e. 
(1) political institutions versus civil society, (2) voting 
versus deliberation and (3) instrumental versus intrin-
sic understanding of participation) that is supposed 
to organise the chapters in functioning as a heuristic 
tool. A concluding chapter could have revisited and 
re-examined the now rather under-developed typol-
ogy. Having said this, the book does indeed succeed 
in introducing the reader to a ‘wide-reaching panora-
ma’ of various intakes to the many democratic dilem-
mas facing the EU and as such merits a wide audi-
ence furthering the debate on European democracy.
Anne Elizabeth Stie
University of Oslo
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Union, and by Jennie Schulze (George Washington 
University) for fieldwork in the Baltic countries on “The 
Language of Belonging: The Russian Minority in the 
Baltic States.” Congratulations to both, and I look for-
ward reading your field reports in this Review in the Fall.
Fees. The Excom announces a raise in member-
ship fees from September 1, 2008. EUSA fees have not 
kept up with inflation while the association has faced 
sharply rising costs at a time of tightening funding 
and slowing membership growth. Over the past year 
EUSA drastically scaled back meeting costs, slashed 
operational costs by going online, and cut general 
administrative expenses. We also approached fund-
ing organizations, sponsors, and firmed our ties with 
institutional members. But we need your help as well 
to keep us healthy and creative. EUSA is introducing 
a three-tiered system whereby the two-year member-
ship fee varies with a member's economic capacity: 
lowest fee and minimal increase for graduate students 
and community college teachers, lower fee and small 
increase for members with a gross annual income 
below $70,000 (Euro 47,000), and higher fee and in-
crease for others. Conference fees will keep up with 
inflation. When all is said and done, EUSA fees, even 
for the highest-paying members, will remain compara-
ble to or lower than those in similar associations. Pre-
cise increases depend on the next quarter's budgetary 
evolution, and will be published in the next Review. 
Blogs. The Excom, in the persons of Dan Kele-
men and Erik Jones, is working on a plan to use the 
EUSA website for hosting blogs and chatrooms on Eu-
ropean studies. This fits beautifully in our philosophy 
to go online—and it adds that most instructive interac-
tive feature. Interest sections will be asked to coordi-
nate at least one such initiative to be hyperlinked to 
their page, but we also appeal to the membership to 
provide input. When you know of an interesting blog, 
would like to start one, if you have ideas about a chat 
room or would like to run one, please contact Erik 
Jones (ejones@jhubc.it) or Dan Kelemen (dkelemen@
polisci.rutgers.edu). Erik and Dan are particularly keen 
to hear from the graduate community. The target date 
for having the online framework in place is October 
1, 2008, but this will, of course, be an ever-evolving 
initiative. EUSA is nearly twenty—strong, eager, and 
immeasurably curious to learn. Life has just begun. 
 
Liebet Hooghe, UNC Chapel Hill and VU Amsterdam
lent way to accommodate a larger proportion of pa-
per proposals than at previous conferences. Papers 
presented at these workshops will, of course, be eli-
gible for the EUSA Prize for Best Conference Paper.
Third, EUSA is introducing teaching workshops, 
which will run on Thursday morning and Saturday 
afternoon. There is a separate call for proposals. 
These panels will be open to a broad audience in-
cluding high school teachers, community college 
teachers, faculty, and graduate students, are eligible.
The Marina del Rey meeting will mark EUSA's 
twentieth birthday, and we plan to celebrate in style. 
In addition to delightful social happenings near the 
Pacific Ocean, we are working on intellectual fire-
works. One such event will be a Plenary under the 
title "Made in the EU: What EU studies has to offer 
to the discipline." The purpose is to reflect on wheth-
er and how studying the European Union has gen-
erated insights beyond EU studies. After a stage of 
discussing whether the EU is an n=1 and a stage of 
importing other disciplines' insights into EU studies, 
have we reached the stage of enriching and export-
ing to the disciplines? Where, and where not? What 
are some fruitful developments, and—possibly—
drawbacks? How does the current state of EU stud-
ies compare with the first fabulous generation of EU 
studies in the 1950s-1960s? We are working to put 
together a strong Plenary, which will include our 2009 
Life-Time Achievement Awardee, Philippe Schmitter. 
Elections. This Review contains a call for elec-
tion nominations to the EUSA executive committee. 
Nominations are due by July 1, 2008, ballots will be 
sent out by September 1, and are due by October 
15, 2008. EUSA is one of a handful of associations 
which selects its officers via direct elections. Please 
make use of your right as EUSA member and stand 
for election. Three slots are available; Frank Schim-
melfennig, Amy Verdun and I will be stepping down 
after the Marina del Rey conference. Please email 
your nomination to Joe Figliulio (eusa@pitt.edu). 
Prizes. The Review details procedure for the Priz-
es for Best Paper (chair: Dan Kelemen), Best Book 
(chair: Amy Verdun), and Best Dissertation (chair: Neil 
Fligstein). Self-nominations are accepted for the Best 
Paper prize; books must be nominated by the Press-
es, and dissertations by department chairs. The 2008 
EUSA Haas Fund Fellowship Competition for summer 
dissertation research was completed. Many thanks to 
Andrea Lenschow and Mitchell Smith, who helped me 
select among 50 applications. The awardees for 2008 
are Jennifer Hadden (Cornell), to conduct fieldwork in 
Brussels mapping the network structure of environmen-
tal civil society organizations pressuring the European 
(continued from p.1)
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EUSA  
Lifetime 
Membership
What is it?
Simply put, it is a one-time dues pay-
ment to EUSA of US$ 1500.
What does it include?
The Lifetime Membership includes 
all regular membership benefits for 
life. Among those benefits currently 
are subscription to the quarterly EUSA 
Review, receipt of occasional EUSA 
monographs, discounted registration 
rates at the EUSA International Con-
ference, subscription to our e-mail List 
Serve, and the opportunity to join EUSA 
interest sections. 
Are there any other benefits?
By making a one-time membership 
payment, you not only avoid the task 
of renewing each year, but gain the 
twin advantages of securing lifetime 
membership at today’s dollar values 
and avoiding future dues increases.
Who should do this?
Any person wishing to support the en-
deavors of the European Union Studies 
Association—the fostering of schol-
arship and inquiry on the European 
integration project. For U.S. taxpayers, 
an additional benefit is a receipt for a 
one-time $500 charitable contribution 
to EUSA, tax-deductible to the extent 
allowed by law (reducing your tax li-
ability for the year in which you become 
a Lifetime Member).
How do I become a Lifetime Member?
Simply mail your check, in US$ and 
made payable to “EUSA,” to the Euro-
pean Union Studies Association, ad-
dress given at right. (We can not accept 
lifetime membership payments by credit 
card.) We will send you a receipt and 
letter of acknowledgment.
EuropEan union StudiES aSSociation
New Individual Membership Form Only (Please type or print)
Name ________________________________________________
Address ______________________________________________
_____________________________________________________
City _________________________________________________
State/Province________________  Postal Code_______________
Country ______________________________________________
Work Telephone _______________________________________
Work Facsimile ________________________________________
E-mail _______________________________________________
Your Professional Affiliation ______________________________
_____________________________________________________
Do you wish to be subscribed to
EUSA’s e-mail List Serve?  _____ yes          _____ no
Membership dues (please check as appropriate):
Individual _____ $90 two-year membership
Student* _____ $55 two-year membership
Lifetime Membership _____ $1500 (+ credit for $500 tax deduction)
* Students must provide copy of current semester’s registration form.
EU Law Interest Section   _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EU Political Economy Interest Section     _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
Teaching the EU Interest Section  _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EU Latin America Caribbean Interest Section   _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EU Economics Interest Section  _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EU Public Opinion and Participation Section    _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EU as Global Actor Section   _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EUSA Public Policy Interest Section  _____ $10 )2 yrs.)
EUSA members may wish to make a contribution to support the work 
of EUSA in any amount over membership dues:
 EUSA Grants and Scholarships Fund $ _____
 Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies $ _____
Total amount of dues and gifts enclosed       $ ________
We prefer payment by check (payable to “EUSA”) when possible. 
Checks must be in US$ and drawn on a USA bank. We also accept 
international money orders and MasterCard or Visa credit cards. Your 
cancelled check or credit card statement will be your receipt.
MasterCard  #  _________/__________/__________/_________
Visa  # _________/__________/__________/_________
Expiry ___/___  Last 3 digits from back side of card ___/___/___
Signature ____________________________________________
Mail or fax this form (please do not mail and fax this form) to:
    European Union Studies Association
    415 Bellefield Hall
    University of Pittsburgh
    Pittsburgh, PA 15260  USA
    Facsimile 412.648.1168 
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Lifetime Membership
$1500 for all our materials, for life, and credit for a one-time tax-deductible contribution of $500
EUSA Grants and Scholarships Fund
to support EU-related scholarship, the EUSA prizes, and travel to the biennial EUSA Conference
Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies 
to honor the seminal work of Ernst B. Haas and support dissertation research in EU studies
Your gifts are tax-deductible to the extent allowable by U.S. tax law. Include a contribution with your membership 
renewal, or contact the EUSA Office to make a contribution. Call 412.648.7635 or e-mail eusa@pitt.edu.
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